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IMPLIED WARRANTIES IN LEASES: THE

NEED FOR CHANGE
By FRANK F. SKILLERN*
"Caveat emptor" as it is applied to leases under which the
lessee may use the demised premises for an express purpose is the
focal point of this article. The rule denies the lessee relief, either as
a defense or as a cause of action, for additionalcosts of repair or
construction if the premises are structurally unfit for the expressed
purpose or if changes must be made in the premises to conform to
local codes relating to that purpose. Mr. Skillern discusses the
development of the rule in these situations, the limited remedies
which are available to a lessee, and the inadequacies of these remedies in modern leasing transactions. He urges that changes in the
nature of leasing transactions necessitate that courts or legislatures
consider implying warranties of fitness for a particularpurpose and
of conformity to building codes in such leases. Mr. Skillern concludes by analyzing the nature of the proposed warranties, the prerequisites for their implication, and the new remedies which would
be available if they were breached.
INTRODUCTION

L

AW under the doctrine of stare decisis may become imbued with
legal principles which were practical when first developed but
which become inadequate at a later date to meet the demands of the
situations they were designed to encompass. The doctrine of caveat
emptor as applied to leases epitomizes such an anachronism. In the
early development of cases concerning real property leases, the courts
applied the strict limitations of property law and determined that
no implied covenants regarding fitness of the premises for a purpose
or habitation existed in a lease. The parties were expected to express
in the document exactly what the state of the premises would be at
time of possession as well as any other facts which the landlord might
guarantee to the tenant as to the condition of the premises.
However desirable such principles were when developed, today
with the growth of urban development causing an increase in leasing
transactions, and the development of unimproved land through leases
requiring construction, these principles are unrealistic and impractical.
Not only do the parties frequently intend a particular (and often
exclusive) use of the premises, but also that the landlord prepare the
*Member of the Colorado Bar; B.A., University of Chicago, 1964; J.D., University of
Denver, 1966.
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premises for the tenant's use. Under these circumstances, the tenant
should be allowed a remedy under the lease when the premises cannot
be used for the express purpose or can be so used only at additional
cost. A study of caveat emptor as it has been applied in specific cases
shows its inadequacy in leasing cases.
The general rule of caveat emptor has been succinctly stated in
Ph. Chaleyer, Inc. v. Simon.' The court, discussing an implied warranty defense, stated, "It has been recently held that a lessor does not
impliedly covenant that the demised premises are suitable for the use
which he is aware is intended by the lessee." 2 Although government
wartime regulations prohibited the lessee from engaging in the business stated in the lease, he was not allowed to rescind the agreement.
Caveat emptor also prevents the lessee from interposing unfitness as a defense to an action for rent. An Indiana case3 involving
the lease of lands on which the lessee wanted to build a drive-in
theater is typical of this principle. The court in awarding rent to
the lessor said,
There is no implied warranty that leased premises are fit for
the purposes for which they are let.... The rule of caveat emptor
applies in the relation of landlord and tenant unless material representations constituting fraud are specifically alleged, or there is
a showing of a fiduciary relationship between the parties. 4
The rule has also been applied to a situation where the lessee
could not occupy the leased premises because the building would
not support his equipment. In Soresi v. Repetti,5 the building
required structural changes before the lessee could install his heavy
equipment. The court disposed of the unfitness defense summarily,
saying, "[T]he tenant has the duty to examine the premises to determine its adaptability for the desired use."'
'91 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.J. 1950). See also 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
225 [2]
(recomp. ed. 1966); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 267 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952), and cases cited therein, where the principle is expressed:
There is no implied covenant or warranty that at the time the term
._. commences the premises are in a tenantable condition or that they are
adapted to the purpose for which leased. The tenant, then, cannot use such
unfitness either as a defense to an action for rent or as a basis for recovery
in tort for damages to person or property. (Footnotes omitted.)
Accord, Davidson v. Fischer, 11 Colo. 583, 19 P. 652 (1888).
2 91 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.N.J. 1950).
3 Anderson Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 123 Ind. App. 388, 110 N.E.2d 506
(1953).
4
Id. at 393, 110 N.E.2d at 508.
- Soresi v. Repetti, 76 A.2d 585 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950).
6
Id. at 586. See also Plaza Amusement Co. v. Rothenberg, 159 Miss. 800, 131 So. 350
(1930) (structural changes at lessee's expense).
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Tort actions are also prohibited by the rule. 7 In Widmar v.
Healey,8 the lessee was denied recovery for injuries resulting from
a stove explosion which occurred due to frozen pipes. In dismissing
the claim the court said, "Inthe absence of fraud or of a covenant,
a lessor does not represent that the premises are tenantable and may
be used for the purposes for which they are apparently intended.'
At this point certain fact situations which are outside the scope
of this paper must be distinguished. The Soresi court denied the
lessee relief for required structural alterations to the leased premises,
which were under the control of the landlord, by adhering to a
questionable application of caveat emptor. It is another matter when
untenantability is caused by factors beyond the control of the lessor.
Recovery has been denied a lessee in this situation too, but the application of caveat emptor seems more appropriate. For example, the
New York courts have denied recovery to a lessee who could not
occupy a building because of noxious gases originating from outside
the building.1 ° Although the defense in that case was an implied
covenant of habitation, the court rejected it." The court discussed
the defense of implied warranty and concluded it was not available.
The point is that the proposed implied warranty should not extend
to defects beyond the control of the lessor. Nor would the doctrine
of implied warranty cover those defects or contingencies which are
foreseeable by the parties. A lessor is allowed to recover rent even
though his lessee could not get a liquor permit and use the premises
as contemplated.' 2 Such a contingency is foreseeable, and no condition will be read into the lease. Caveat emptor should continue to
7 See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 1, at 267, and cases cited therein.

See also Zatloff v. Winkleman, 90 R.I. 403, 158 A.2d 874 (1960).
8247 N.Y. 94, 159 N.E. 874 (1928).
9 Id. The court implies that recovery may have been allowed if the action had been
brought on the theory of a covenant to repair. For a discussion of a lessor's tort
liability for latent defects in the premises known to him or for liability when he
undertakes repairs of demised premises, see Shaw v. Butterworth, 327 Mo. 622, 38
S.W.2d 57 (1931), and Holzhauer v. Sheeny, 127 Ky. 28, 104 S.W. 1034 (1907).
See also Marx v. Standard Oil Co., 6 N.J. Super. 39, 69 A.2d 748 (1949), where
the court states, "There is no implied covenant by a lessor that the demised premises
are suitable for the use which he is aware is intended by the lessee. The lessor is
not liable to the lessee or to invitees of the lessee for injuries received by them in
accidents that may be attributed to the faulty planning or construction of the
premises." Id. at 41, 69 A.2d at 749.
"°Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889).
15 The court held, "It is not open to discussion in this state, that a lease of real
property only, contains no implied covenant of this character [habitation], and
that . . . unless there has been fraud, deceit, or wrong-doing on the part of the
landlord, the tenant is without remedy, even if the demised premises are unfit for
occupation." Id. at 113, 23 N.E. at 127.
12
Goodman v. Sullivan, 94 Ohio App. 390, 114 N.E.2d 856 (1952). But see Hyland
v. Parkside Inv. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1148, 162 A. 521 (1932) (zoning ordinance
prohibited use after possession -held,
restricted use in lease is express guaranty).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 44

control those cases in which the non-use is the result of a foreseeable
problem or of a defect caused by one other than the lessor. 8
It would be wrong to conclude that the doctrine of caveat emptor
means a lessee is always without a remedy if he is unable to use the
premises. Under contract law the tenant may rescind the lease if he
can prove fraud or mutual mistake. 4 In such cases the burden is
upon the lessee to show the statement, the materiality of the statement, and reliance. Frequently, as in the cases discussed here, this
burden is too great.'" The lessee usually does not receive a statement
about the suitability of the land, but rather assumes this from the
fact that the lease states the purpose and use of the demised premises.
Rescission on the grounds of mutual mistake was recently
granted by a California court. 6 The lease stated that the premises
were to be used for a bar-restaurant. However, the building would
not support the weight of a bar on the second floor. The court
expressly found that no structural changes were required on the
leased premises; instead they would have to be made on portions
of the building under the control of the lessor. Moreover, it found
that both parties thought the building, without modification, could
be used for the intended purposes, and the necessary costs were not
expected by either. The court allowed rescission because of the
mutual mistake.
Another remedy, derived from property law, is constructive eviction.' 7 One such case was Panagos v. Fox,'8 where the lessor had
built a restaurant, barbecue, and dairy bar for the lessee. The building when completed had defective walls which would not withstand
1 This situation must be distinguished from the facts in Economy v. S.B. & L. Bldg.

Corp., 138 Misc. 296, 245 N.Y.S. 352 (1930), where the court allowed the lessee
to recover advance rent when he was unable to obtain a cabaret license because the
building was not fireproof in accordance with the local building code. This result
was not based on an implied warranty of suitability even though there was an expressed purpose in the lease. The court held that the licensing authority had no discretion to waive the requirements of the building code, and l[t]he contract, therefore,
was incapable of lawful performance when it was made, although it is not to be
supposed that any illegality was contemplated by the parties to it." Id. at 297, 245
N.Y.S. at 354. Thus the illegality constitutes failure of consideration. The Goodman
result, discussed at note 12 supra, is an example of the situation in which the
licensing authority does have discretion. The court in Economy states that then "[i]f
the tenant chose to take a lease without conditions under such circumstances, and so,
to bind himself absolutely for the payment of rent, the court could not relieve him
from his contract." Id. at 297, 245 N.Y.S. at 354.
14 See Williams v. Puccinelli, 236 Cal. App. 2d 512, 46 Cal. Rptr. 285 '(Dist. Ct. App.
Cal. 1965).
lrSee, e.g., Soresi v. Repetti, 76 A.2d 585 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950) (lessee-defendant claim of misrepresentation denied); Ph. Chaleyer, Inc. v. Simon, 91 F. Supp.
5 (D.N.J. 1950) (lessee's action to rescind denied).
16 Williams v. Puccinelli, 236 Cal. App. 2d 512, 46 Cal. Rptr. 285 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal.
1965), which has been characterized by one writer as "an apt illustration of the
conflict" between property and contract law principles in leases. Note, A Contractual
Approach to Real Property Leases - A Strike at Caveat Emptor, 2 CALIF. WESTERN
L. Rxv. 133 (1966).
17 See, e.g., Leonard v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 577, 41 N.W. 695 (1889).
' 310 Mich. 157, 16 N.W.2d 700 ('1944).
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water. The lessee sued to recover his deposit because the building
was untenantable for his purposes. Recovery was granted on the
theory of constructive eviction which the court defined as "any disturbance of the tenant's possession by the landlord or by someone
under his authority whereby the premises are rendered unfit for
occupancy for the purposes for which they were demised, or the
tenant is deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, if the
tenant abandons the premises within a reasonable time. '"19
Rescission of a lease is not always a desirable remedy. Quite
often a long term lease is involved, and the demised premises have
been selected for reasons collateral to the issues which may be
raised in the rescission action. Hence, the premises are still desired
if the defects are corrected or the alterations necessary to enable the
lessee to use the premises are made. The appropriate remedy is not
rescission, but recovery of damages incurred due to the required
changes. Thus damages in the amount of the cost of alterations or
for any other harm is a more desirable solution for the lessee.
The remedy of constructive eviction is frequently unavailable
because the lessee usually can use the premises for some purpose so
that the premises are not deemed untenantable. Typically he is denied
the particular use he intended. The remedy is also undesirable
because it terminates the lease. Constructive eviction also is not an
adequate solution in those situations where only a portion of the
leased premises are unusable.
In addition to the foregoing remedies for the lessee, one exception has been grafted onto the general rule of caveat emptor. A lease
is not enforced against those lessees coming within its provisions.
The exception was first stated in Smith v. Marrable,20 where the
court said there is an implied condition of habitation in the letting
of a furnished house. This broad statement was qualified in later
cases. 2 The exception was limited to situations in which a furnished
dwelling was leased for a short and definite duration of time. The
warranty implied was that the premises were habitable. Thus, where
23
22
the basement was filled with water, the home infected with insects,
or vermin the warranty of habitability was breached and the tenant
could properly quit the premises.
19Id. at 161, 16 N.W.2d at 702.
20 11 M. & W. 6, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).

21 In two other cases in 1843 the English courts were asked to apply the rule as stated
in Smith. The limitations discussed later were found to be facts in Smith and prerequisites to the exception. Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. & W. 52, 152 Eng. Rep. 1108
(Ex. 1843); Hart v. Windsor, 12 M. & W. 66, 152 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ex. 1843).

22For development of the exception see 11 BOSTON U.L. REv. 119 (1931), and authorities cited therein.
23See, e.g., Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). But see Davenport
v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947).
2

4 E.g., Delamater v. Foreman. 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
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The exception is apparently accepted universally in the United
States.2 5 It has, however, always been strictly limited in application."8
It has not been extended to letting unfurnished dwellings.2 7 It has
'
28
been recognized in leases for periods of the summer, a "season, 29
eight months, 0 and one year, 3 ' but apparently for no period longer
than one year. The basis of the exception is that the tenant has no
time to investigate as caveat emptor requires. Both parties know that
immediate occupancy for a specific purpose is desired, and the lessee
frequently is from out of town and is unable to inspect the house,
2
especially when the lease is for a short period of time.1
The remedies granted under the contract theory of implied
warranty have been rarely applied to leases. Few cases have been
found which allow a lessee recovery on this basis. In one such case,
f. D. Young Corporationv. McClintic,3 the lessee sued to cancel the
lease because the building which was prepared by the lessor was
defective and not complete at time of occupancy. The court held
there is an implied warranty in the lease of a building under construction or to be constructed that it will be suitable for the lessee's
purposes expressed in the lease if progress has not reached a stage
permitting inspection of the premises. 4 Another case, Woolford v.
Electric Appliances, Inc., 5 involved the lease of a stall under con25The
2

American cases are reviewed in 11 BOSTON U.L.REv. 119 (1931).

6See Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947), where the court
-- '-]

'WlTeth

-et

deedn

for the shse

a

he sevashore, he

impliedly agreed that the house was reasonably suitable for immediate use and
occupancy by the tenant. ... [But) a condition that the premises are fit for habitation
"isimplied only with regard to the state of the premises at the beginning of the
tenancy and does not cover defects which arise later... '" Id. at 632-33, 70 N.E.2d
at 794-95 (citations omitted). See also Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 756,
39 N.E.2d 644, 646 (1942), where the court states about Ingalls that "[t]his is a
departure from the general rule and should be confined within narrow limits." See
also 11 BOSTON U.L. REv. 119 (1931), where the author states that in applying the
exception to the rule of caveat emptor the American courts did so only insofar as
the warranty extended to the chattels, furnishings, or goods which were incorporated
into the real property lease; caveat emptor was still the rule if the defect of the
furnished premises was structural or related to the real property. Cf. Murray v.
Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (1888).
2
7 Murray v. Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (1888).
28
Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. &W. 6, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 '(Ex. 1843).
29
Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 349, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
30
Young v. Povich, 121 Me.141, 116 A. 26 (1922).
31
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). For criticism of the
one year period as too long a period for application of the exception, see 45 MARQ.
L. REV. 630 (1962).
32
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
33 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1933).
34 J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). See also
Hunter v. Porter, 10 Idaho 72, 77 P. 434 (1904) '(implied warranty in building
under construction) ; Hardman Estate v. McNair, 61 Wash. 74, 111 P. 1059 (1910)
(implied warranty premises to be arranged for tenant).
35 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938).

s

'
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struction in an open market at the time of leasing. When finished,
the refrigeration in the stall was inadequate to preserve meats which
the lessee offered for sale. The court held that under circumstances
where there is construction to enable the lessee to put the premises
to a particular use, a warranty that the construction will be adequate
to permit the use is implied in the contract. Here the refrigeration
unit was for one purpose - to enable the lessee to keep meats for
sale. Since the unit was inadequate, the lessee recovered on an implied
warranty that the stall as constructed would be reasonably suited for
the intended purpose. 6
It is important to note that in each of these cases caveat emptor
was rejected because there was no way to inspect the final fitness of
the premises under construction. The remedy in this situation is
analogous to the recent decisions rejecting the rule of caveat emptor
in the purchase of a new home and instead allowing recovery on the
implied warranty theory.3 7 The rationale under both circumstances
resembles that applied to the lease of a furnished home for a short
period of time. In these cases the lessee had little or no opportunity
to inspect the premises and hence could not be penalized for what he
could not observe. The warranty seems to be implied in the contract
to construct and not in the lease agreement. Only one case has been
discovered in which the theory of implied warranty was recognized
38
on leased premises not under construction.
Several reasons exist for extending the contract theory of implied
warranty concerning the condition of demised premises to leases.
In addition to the changes already mentioned in the nature of leasing
transactions, 39 other reasons exist for not strictly applying caveat
emptor to those transactions today. The lessee and lessor are not on
a basis of equal knowledge regarding the premises. The owner of
a building will usually be notified of building code violations present
36
37

Id.

E.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). For a discussion of
implied warranties in newly completed homes see Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales
of Real Property- Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961).
The application of the implied warranty to the builder-vendor of a newly completed
home is a logical extention of its application to a contract of sale of a home under
construction. Carpenter v. Donohoe, supra at 83, 388 P.2d at 403.
38
Hyland v. Parkside Inv. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 1148, 162 A. 521 (1932). The court
held a lessee who was unable to use the demised premises due to a zoning ordinance
passed after possession could recover advance rent. The court said, "In this lease the
landlord specifically restricted the use to one purpose, and we think this was an
express guaranty of the fitness of the premises for that particular purpose. To hold
otherwise would be an absurdity. A lease for a single purpose is void if that purpose
is unlawful." Id. at 1149, 162 A. at 521. Not only is finding an express warranty
under such circumstances against the weight of authority, but also the court cited no
authority for the proposition that the warranty is present in a lease even though no
remodeling or further construction on the emis
remises is necessary. Accord,
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 269 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
3
9 Text preceding note 1 supra.
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on his premises and also of special regulations regarding his land.4"
The lessee will not, without special investigation, know of these
violations, nor will he know of structural defects in the building
itself. It is not unreasonable to attribute knowledge of these facts
to the lessor. He should be able to alert the lessee to them or easily
discover if the use intended by the lessee is structurally feasible. To
protect the lessee in these leasing transactions it is necessary to consider and apply a limited doctrine of implied warranties in leases.
I.

THE IMPLIED WARRANTY

The nature of the implied warranty in the lease would be that
the leased premises are suitable for the purpose of the tenant and
that they are built in conformity to the applicable local codes. Thus,
the lessor would assure that the premises can immediately be put to
the use intended -by the lessee and that the lessee may do so lawfully.
If the premises do not conform to the code regulations or are structurally defective, the lessor would have to make the necessary repairs
or compensate the lessee for having them done.
The warranty is designed to protect a lessee in various situations,
although the usual one is where the lessor has superior knowledge.
It will provide a remedy when the lessor has a structually defective
building which is incapable of being used as the lessee planned 41
Frequently a lessor agrees to build on the premises to suit the tenant,
.nld the lease provides that the constr ctmon shail ronfnrm to the
building codes. But if the lessee is a restaurant owner, a special
plumbing system may be required by the plumbing code even though
it is not required by the building code to which the building would
conform. If the building is adequate for the building code requirements, the lessor has met the express covenant, but the premises are
not suitable for occupancy for the express purpose of the lease. The
lessee must install new plumbing facilities in order to use the premises in accordance with the lease terms. Under the implied covenant
that the premises conform to the code regulations applicable to the
intended use, the lessee could recover from the lessor the costs of
installing the additional system.
A.

Limitations

These warranties should be limited in application and would
not be implied in all leases. Certain prerequisites must be shown
4

°See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961), where the
court discusses this point.
41The facts of Soresi v. Repetti, 76 A.2d 585 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950), and Anderson Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 123 Ind. App. 388, 110 N.E.2d 506
(1953), would bring both cases within the implied warranty theory.
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before the implied warranties would be imposed. First, the lease
must be for a stated purpose before the implied warranty of suitability should apply. If the purpose is known, the lessor is able
to determine whether the building is structurally adequate for the
expressed purpose. If the lessor is to build improvements on the
premises for the lessee, he must check the necessary regulations to
determine if his construction satisfies all local codes; he must also
make the lessee aware of defects such as inadequate plumbing or
electrical systems which may make the premises unsuitable for the
intended use. Failure to do so will forfeit his right to recover his
rent without penalty. However, if the purpose is not expressed in a
lease, actual knowledge of the lessee's intended purpose should be
sufficient to put the lessor on notice and bring the implied warranty
into action. Thus, if a lease mentions no purpose but the parties
only discuss a particular business of the lessee, the lessor should not
be allowed to claim that the implied warranty is inapplicable because
the purpose is not expressed. He should be held to have actual
knowledge sufficient to enable him to ascertain the suitability of
his building for that purpose.
A second limitation on the implication of these warranties is
that the defects causing the unsuitability must be within the lessor's
control. Thus, a dwelling rendered untenantable because of noxious
gases arising from the neighborhood 42 would not fall within the
implied warranty. The lessor should not be held accountable for
faults which he has no power to alter. Nor can the warranty apply
to cases in which the lessee before occupancy decides to alter his use.
The implied warranty of conformity with local code regulations
must be limited to situations in which the untenantability of the
premises is caused by violation of a specific code regulation relating
to the intended use. Thus, if the code is applicable to drug stores,
but not grocery stores, and the lease use is a grocery store, the warranty has not been breached even though use of the premises for the
sale of drugs is not possible. The lessor can only be held to assure
specific uses of the premises - not all uses. However, this warranty
does not cover the situation in which the lessee knows he needs a
particular permit to operate the intended business. If he is unable
to get the required permit and thus cannot put the premises to the
intended use, he cannot recover under this warranty. As under current law, 8 this example is a foreseeable contingency which the parties
can anticipate and provide for in the lease. The implied warranty
should not cover those contingencies which the parties can anticipate.
v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889).
Goodman v. Sullivan, 94 Ohio App. 390, 114 N.E.2d 856 (1952).

4Franklin
4
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The implied warranties can only apply to defects which are
latent and which make the premises unsuitable. Thus, the tenant
cannot claim that the implied warranty of suitability has been
breached if he leases land for a drive-in restaurant in a residential
area in which business uses are prohibited. This fact is readily
observable to him because zoning restrictions are a matter of public
record.
B.

Remedies
The remedy for breach of the implied warranty of suitability or
conformity to local codes must differ from the present law, i.e., the
lessee must be able to recover the cost of altering the demised premises to permit the intended use or to conform to the code provisions.
Since he may want to remain in possession, he must be allowed a
damage remedy. These additional costs should be recovered from
the lessor in a lump sum as damages. If the defect is the proximate
cause of personal injuries, damages should be recoverable for the
harm resulting therefrom.
Another remedy for the lessee should be reformation of the
lease. If only a portion of the leased premises is untenantable, or
if a portion does not meet the local code requirements, then the
lessee should be allowed to decide whether he can or cannot use the
remainder of the leased premises. If he can use part of them, the
lease should be reformed to cover only the area in use and then
be terminated as to that which is unsuitable. At that time, the rent
should be reduced in an equitable amount by deducting the value of
the portion returned to the lessor from the total rent due. Reformation would thus enable the lessee to recoup his losses on partially
adequate leased premises. It is an important remedy since leased
areas are frequently designed for dual purposes such as a cafeteria
in one area, kitchen in an adjacent one, or a bar on one floor of a
building and a restaurant on another.
The final remedy should be rescission and cancellation of the
lease. If the premises are totally unusable and unsuited for the
intended purposes, the lease should be terminated. However, this
remedy should be strictly applied, so that if the purposes of a lease
and the premises demised are separable, the lessor may enforce the
lease as to a suitable portion. For example, if the lease states that
one lessee will maintain a lounge on one floor and a cafeteria on
another, but the cafeteria cannot be put in the building, the lessor
should be able to enforce the lease and compel the lessee to put in
the lounge if it is economically feasible. In short, the lessee cannot
declare a lease rescinded merely because the warranties are not met
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as to a portion of the lease. This restriction is particularly pertinent
if the lessee has been granted remedies for partial breaches of these
covenants.
The remedies for the breach of the implied warranty of suitability or for conformity to local codes would fill the gaps in the
current legal remedies. Reformation of the lease provides something
less than complete termination of that contract. Damages enable
the lessee to recoup his losses and yet not sacrifice the lease. These
solutions are needed today because the lease is a long term arrangement which is entered into for multifarious reasons. It is no longer
simply for the occupancy of a building suited for one and only one
purpose; it may be intended to serve several functions. Today the
improvements may be built by developers for particular lessees and
with specific purposes in mind. The land may be desirable as a business location even in a suburban area, and even if one intended use
fails. The building may be constructed to suit the lessee or for his
business purposes.
II. CONCLUSION
Leasing law has been strict in applying the doctrine of caveat
emptor to a lessee who finds the demised premises unsuitable for
occupancy. The lessee has been held liable for rent of the premises
even though the lease stated that the premises were to be used for a
particular purpose. Under the rule of caveat emptor the courts have
held that the lessee had a duty to inspect the premises to determine
their suitability for his intended use. The only exception to this
rule was the case of a short term lease of a furnished dwelling.
As the lease law evolved, the lessee was provided relief if he
could prove fraud or misrepresentation, mutual mistake, or constructive eviction. However, this relief took the form of cancellation
or termination of the lease and allowed no recovery for damages or
additional expenses of the lessee. In a few other cases the lessee was
allowed relief on the theory of implied warranty that the premises
being prepared would be suitable for the lessee's purpose. The
warranties in those cases arose from the contract to construct or
remodel and from the fact the work had not progressed far enough
to allow adequate inspection. In each of them the lease was signed
prior to construction of the leased premises.
Modern leasing transactions necessitate reevaluation of the doctrine of caveat emptor as applied to leases. The lessee no longer has
as much knowledge of the premises as the lessor. Building code
regulations or violations are made known to the lessor, not to the
lessee. The lessor is in a -better position to know of latent structural
defects in a building which might go unnoticed by the inspecting
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lessee since the plans and specifications of the building are not in
the latter's possession.
The nature of leases also warrants reevaluation of this rule.
Developers more and more frequently seek to obtain leases on an
area of land before building. The lessee usually invests much time
and money in determining that the area has good income potential
and in preparing the leased space for his business. He cannot afford
to discover after occupancy that a specific local code regulation regarding his business has not been met in construction of the building.
The additional cost to correct the defect is unexpected. He does not
want to cancel the lease, since he has built up good will and potential
for his business in this area in anticipation of a long term lease. He
needs the remedy which an implied warranty theory provides.
Moreover, the lessee, especially the small businessman, cannot
accomplish the inspection which caveat emptor requires. He rarely
will be familiar with wiring or plumbing, for example, and will not
know if these systems are adequate. Nor can he afford to hire a
professional engineer to investigate the site and make tests to determine the structural suitability of the building and land. The costs
of this expert would be prohibitive, and yet caveat emptor requires
the man who wants to engage in the laundry business to know that
the building can support his heavy equipment. Such information is
available to the lessor who can in turn inform the potential lessee
of the physical suitability of the premises and of costs required by
the lessee to adapt the premises to the use. The lessee must still
inspect for patent defects such as broken windows, cracks in the
wall, or unclean premises; he cannot recover under this theory for
defects which a reasonable inspection would uncover, and the latter
remains a question of fact.
Under circumstances in which the premises are unsuitable for
an express use because of structural defects or local code violations,
the lessee should be allowed relief against the lessor on a contractual
theory of implied warranty. If a lease expresses a use or if the lessor
knows of the intended use, the lessor should be held to impliedly
covenant that the premises are fit for the use and conform to all
local code regulations regarding the use. The warranty would be
breached only if the defect is the cause of the unsuitability of the
premises or if the code violation directly relates to the intended use.
The warranty should not extend to defects which are beyond the
lessor's ability to control or remedy. Contingencies which are foreseeable at the time of the lease should also be excepted from operation of the warranties.
The implied warranty of suitability for purpose and of con-
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formity to local codes regarding the purpose would provide the
lessee with a remedy less stringent than that available under current
leasing law. Remedies now available frequently involve fact situations which would be covered by an implied warranty, but require
proof of fraud, mistake, constructive eviction, or breach of the
implied warranty of quiet enjoyment to allow relief to the lessee.44
The relief under the theory of implied warranties would stop short
of cancellation of the lease, i.e., damages, proportionate reduction of
rent, or reformation of the lease. Not only are these remedies more
consistent with the intent of the parties, but they also enable the
lessee to remain in possession under the lease.
The application of an implied warranty theory to leases gives
recognition of the changes in leasing transactions today. The theory
acknowledges that a lease is in essence not only a demise but also a
sale, in the commercial sense, of an interest in land and, more
importantly, is a contractual relationship.45 The implied warranty
suggested here would conform more closely to the intentions of the
parties as well as to actual business expectations.

for the breach of implied warranty of quiet enjoyment has been occasionally
utilized to seek a remedy for situations where the premises are unsuitable. See, e.g.,
Croskey v. Shawnee Realty Co., 225 S.W.2d 509, 513-14 (K.C. Ct. App. Mo. 1949),
where the court, quoting from Shaw v. Butterworth, 327 Mo. 622, 628, 38 S.W.2d
57, 60 (1931), determined,
"In the absence of a covenant or promise, the tenant must take the premises
in the condition in which he finds them, for to a mere contract of letting
the rule of caveat emptor is relevant. An implied covenant on the part of the
landlord that the premises are suitable for the purposes for which they are
rented, or that they are in any particular condition, does not arise from the
mere renting of premises."
45 This idea is not meant to suggest that the court must find the leasing agreement was
a "sale" before the implied warranties should be enforced. Thc-warranties should be
the basis of a cause of action y decisional or statutory law and shou
aowed
when the1imhit~ tfins iscussed previously a-re preseT-fi-o-h
FtT
d not depend
upon the presence of technicalities such as a "sale," or the formal requirements in
the law of sales for implying warranties. The basis of the action is the leasing agreement under the conditions outlined above - not the fact that a "sale" occurred.
4Suit

